Family systems are among the most enduring and universal institutions that human beings have devised; in one form or another, they exist in every society as a social arrangement for regulating reproduction, supporting the young, and caring for the elderly. The survival of family systems stems from their remarkable ability to transform their structure and practices in response to new demographic, social, and economic conditions. That the family system has persevered despite the vast global changes of the last century attests to this resiliency and adaptability. But there are a number of indications that the family's capacity to perform its traditional functions is becoming strained as the pace of social and economic change quickens around the globe.
Family formation and childbearing, robust a halfcentury ago, have slowed to below populationreplacement levels in most developed nations. Marriage has become a less central and stable institution, making child care more precarious. The breakdown of the gender-based division of labor has challenged women and men to develop more complex routines for managing work and family roles. Greater parental investment and support is required for childrearing today: lengthier and increasingly expensive post-secondary education and depressed job prospects have prolonged young adults' dependency on their parents. On the other hand, a rapid increase in longevity has enlarged the ranks of the elderly, contributing-along with the smaller number of the youngto an increase in their share of the total population. This adds to the elderly's capac ity to assist younger generations, though at the same time it increases the future burdens on younger generations to support and care for elderly family members when they become frail and incapacitated.
The decline of fertility and growth of longevity have produced a rapidly aging society in many parts of the world. This pattern of population aging will be accentuated as the large cohort of individuals born after World War II-the baby boomers-reaches seniority. The demographic pro½le for each wealthy nation differs depending on the timing of its baby boom and the magnitude of its baby bust (a consequence of rapidly decreasing fertility in the latter third of the last century). Some are aging sooner or more rapidly than others; these nations have provided some insights about the effects of population aging. (For more on demographic shifts in the United States, see S. Jay Olshansky's essay in this volume.)
Public systems such as Social Security and Medicare were devised a century or more ago partly to relieve some of the economic and social pressures on the family -midlife parents in particular-to assume complete responsibility for the care of both the young and the elderly. Due to population aging, these public support systems will face considerable pressure in many so cieties, including in the United States. Any reductions in public expenditure will only increase the burden on working-age adults already challenged by the temporal and ½nancial demands of supporting the elderly while simultaneously having to invest more in caring for and educating the young. In this essay, we explore whether families will be up to this task.
We begin this inquiry by briefly summarizing some salient ½ndings on practices of intergenerational support and exchange in economically developed nations. We will then discuss changing conditions that are likely to complicate (and possibly alter or erode) these existing familial relationships and patterns of intergenerational resource allocation. We also examine coping mechanisms families develop to accommodate intergenerational needs. In the second part of the paper, we will describe the work of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on an Aging Society, which has devised a series of projects to explore these social is sues linked with aging societies, and whose work may contribute signi½cantly to the knowledge base that informs U.S. policy on aging. We conclude by considering some possible dilemmas that policy-makers may face in their efforts to support families.
Avast amount of research has been done over the past several decades on how generations within family systems support and assist each other over time. Patterns of intergenerational exchange operate quite differently in traditional societies, developing countries, and advanced economies. Traditional societies have often devised means of protecting the elderly generation (G1) by maintaining intergenerational households or mandating that the middle generation (G2) provide ½nan -cial support to elderly parents, though older parents (G1) may also continue to assist their adult children by caring for their offspring (G3) or working. Two distinctive fea tures of traditional systems are that the oldest generation 1) does not survive in great numbers and 2) produces a relative ly high number of children who can pro vide support as they come of age. Moreover, low geographical mobility tends to keep families in the same locale, ensuring that parents will have surviving children around to provide support when they are no longer able to take care of themselves. 1 This general pattern of an upward flow of resources from the middle to the oldest generation typically persists in developing countries, though due to the expansion of labor markets, second-generation members often move away from their birth communities to seek higher incomes. In international migration, this may lead to considerable remittances from G2s to G1s. On the other hand, children may sometimes have to be left behind in the care of their grandparents, especially when mothers move to wealthier countries (often to become paid care workers for children or the elderly). The introduction of old-age pensions-frequently the ½rst step of public social assistance-greatly improves the ½nancial position of the elderly and may lead to a reversal of the ½nancial flow by enabling them to aid the families of their adult children and help cover the schooling expenses of their grandchildren. 2 In nations with advanced economies, the flow of economic assistance more generally moves downward. Children and grandchildren require more and longer support due to extended and more costly education and dif½cult transitions into work; conversely, the elderly are often economically better-off thanks to public support, savings, and improvements in health care. In all European nations, parents continue to provide more economic assistance to their children and grandchildren than they receive (at least through their seventies). This is true even if we include nonmonetary help. 3 Children (and possibly grandchildren) often reciprocate by aiding their parents when they become frail or incapacitated, but are less often called upon to provide economic assistance to elderly parents (many of whom enjoy the economic security provided by their social security bene½ts, pensions, and savings). Those in need of personal care often ½rst turn to spouses or partners, but children may also step in, either as caregivers or as organizers and monitors of third-party or institutional care.
Admittedly, this is an oversimpli½ed picture of intergenerational exchange in wealthy countries; there is much variation both within and across individual nations. First, the magnitude of public support var ies greatly among welfare systems. Second, countries also differ in terms of the forms of their support systems (familybased versus individualized). 4 Third, the flow of resources works differently across different economic strata. Among the poor and near-poor, children may be called upon to help out both economically and nonmonetarily throughout their lives and cannot readily afford to purchase as sistance for older relatives, as might be com mon among the more privileged. Fourth, there is a great deal of evidence showing that racial and ethnic differences correlate with dif ferent patterns of support and exchange. 5 Some ethnic groups are much more likely to maintain intergenerational households in which the volume of support and assistance is more intense and reciprocal over time. 6 (Interestingly, however, there is a paucity of evidence on the workings of intergenerational households in con temporary societies.) Finally, divorce and remarriage affect the amount of support provided both downward and upward throughout the life course. Di vorced fathers not infrequently lose contact with some or all of their children, who in turn are unwilling or unavailable to as sist their fathers in later life. Stepfathers may ½ll in to some extent, but there is strong evidence that children feel less ob ligated to care for elderly stepparents than parents. 7 As we contemplate a potential retreat of public systems of assistance for the elderly in the next several decades, there are sound reasons to be concerned about families' ability to pick up the slack. This is especially true in the United States, where the population is becoming more economically strati½ed, more ethnically diverse, and more varied in its family forms.
Impending demographic change in the size of elderly and middle-aged cohorts drives much of the concern about the pressures likely to mount on parents in midlife and late midlife (roughly ages forty-½ve to sixty-four). 8 These middle-aged parents (mothers especially) are often called the "sandwiched generation," squeezed by the simultaneous demands of supporting their children, assisting a frail elderly par ent, and being in the labor force. Some ar gue that this term exaggerates the pressure faced by this generation, because many parents take active steps to avoid being in this position or do not have to ½ll all three roles at once. Nonetheless, it is highly likely that a substantial percentage of families will face these circumstances in the next two or three decades. Though there is little research describing the incidence and duration of episodes of being "sandwiched" for middle-aged adults, we know that about one-third of women in late mid dle age (between ½fty-½ve and sixty-nine) report giving support to both children and parents at some point. 9 This is likely to in crease, since the proportion of adults who have both children and living parents is rising. 10 The number of elderly (including parents, parents-in-law, and stepparents) who survive to become incapacitated or frail will increase as the baby-boom cohort advances into their later years in the next several decades. This poses a new challenge for the reconciliation of family and work, similar to that faced by young parents. At the same time, unless current patterns of family formation rapidly reverse-and there is no reason to expect that they willa rising number of young adults will not begin having children until their thirties or even later. More than one-third of births are now to women over thirty, and the average age at ½rst birth has risen steadily, from twenty-one in 1970 to nearly twentysix in 2012. 11 Not all of these young adults remain dependents while forming partnerships and having children, but many do receive partial or complete support from their parents in their early adult years. The proportion of young adults being assisted by their parents has been steadily rising over the past several decades. 12 Were this pattern of the prolongation of early adulthood to continue, it would result in an even greater level of "sandwiching," mandating that a growing proportion of midlife adults divide time and resources between their parents, their children, and possibly even their grandchildren.
These demographic trends of greater long evity and later family-formation are compounded by rapid changes in marriage practices that have tended to make family obligations more uncertain. Compared to four or ½ve decades ago, young adults marry later and divorce more often, making cohabitation and remarriage more common and socially acceptable. Marriage has become a less central institution for organizing childbearing than it was a half-cen tury ago; a growing proportion of chil d ren are born out of wedlock, often into cohabiting unions (which are less stable family forms, particularly in the United States). 13 We know all too little about felt obligations to extended kin in varied family circumstances. Existing evidence suggests that marriage-especially a ½rst marriageconfers a greater sense of obligation to inlaws than do consensual unions. 14 Cohabitation may offer a more discretion ary and 15 A third trend associated with family change may also affect the availability of support for older people in the future: childlessness has been rising rapidly in many nations with advanced economies, including the United States, where close to one-sixth of all women in their forties are currently childless. 16 Fortunately, much of the research on this topic suggests that the childless are not necessarily stranded in old age because many ac quire surrogate caregivers who may or may not be kin. 17 Nonetheless, the relative shortage of children among people entering midlife may eventually reduce the amount of assistance and care available to certain subsets of the elderly.
The constellation of family changes has not been uniformly distributed; markedly different family forms exist across the social strata. As inequality has widened in the United States and elsewhere, family practices among the privileged, the disadvantaged, and those in the middle have become more pronounced and distinct from one another. 18 Disadvantaged families are generally formed earlier, typically outside of marriage, and they are less stable, with less con tact between fathers and children. 19 Fam ily units are more complex, often contain ing step-or surrogate parents and halfsiblings. 20 Coresidence among three generations is a common adaptive strategy for managing economic pressures and the greater need for assistance by kin. 21 At the same time, the elderly have signi½cant -ly shorter life spans, suggesting that pressures on midlife parents (often ma tri archs charged with keeping the family together) are considerable. Cutbacks in pub lic support most acutely affect these overburdened families, and it is unclear how parents will be able to invest adequately in their children while supporting frail parents or grandparents (shorter gen erations result in more four-generation families in this segment of the population, owing to earlier childbearing ages).
Issues facing the privileged are likely to be less acute, if only because of their great er resources for purchasing assistance when needed. Nonetheless, many will face an over lap between demands from children and from elder parents and in-laws. Affluent parents tend to provide high levels of support to young adult children and at the same time have parents with relatively high life expectancies. 22 As greater numbers of baby-boomers reach old age, affluent parents will have to contend with the declining health of their parents and inlaws while they are still launching their young-adult children.
Families of modest and moderate means -the middle third of the economic distribution-face a different situation, at least in countries with limited social safety nets such as the United States. They are squeezed economically because, though they are ineligible for public assistance, they may have obligations to ½nancially as sist their older parents and adult children (who may themselves be ineligible for so cial services). So-called middle-class families may well feel the effects of an aging society most acutely. It seems likely that more of these families will adopt the coresidence strategy of low-income households in an effort to pool their resources.
It is impossible to know how economic growth and wage trajectories for various job sectors will mitigate the pressures on families in different countries twenty or thirty years out; however, the prospects do not look especially bright, given that many advanced economies are struggling to maintain the robust economic growth necessary for a good labor market of young and middle-aged adults that are capable of helping to support the oldest generation. Perhaps older persons-who are in better health than previous generations-will be more amenable to remaining in the labor force through their late sixties and early seventies, both to improve their own circumstances and to contribute resources to younger generations.
This much we do know: large parts of the future elderly are likely to be less affluent than current cohorts of individuals over sixty-½ve. And, in all likelihood, many of their children will be less well off in their middle years than their parents were at the same age. Young adults today are as welleducated (or better-educated) than their parents were, but they are entering adulthood with more debt and more modest labor-market prospects.
These speculations about the future of intergenerational relations are informed by current research, but there are still many unknowns. The demographic growth of the elderly population, followed by a far smaller cohort of younger and middle-aged adults, is ½xed, but we do not know exactly how these cohorts will look in another twenty or thirty years as the baby-boom cohort ages. They will certainly be more eth nically diverse, but whether current trends in economic inequality and family change will persist is less clear.
What will the health and economic status of future Americans be? How will the circumstances of the elderly be affected by trends in health and disease and changes in family structure, educational attainment, and public and family support systems? The answers to these questions de pend on a range of alternative future sce nar ios, each with a different set of costs and bene½ts. Economic and demographic mod eling is a useful tool that provides a simpli½ed representation of our future reality.
A team of researchers from the MacArthur Network in collaboration with the Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics at the University of Southern California has been building such a model:
the Future Americans Model (fam). fam is a simulation model that uses data on groups of Americans over age twenty-½ve from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Health and Retirement Study in order to understand the short-and long-term implications of changes across cohorts on well-being from birth through death. This model expands on the technical infrastructure and expertise the researchers developed while building and using a similar model, the Future Elderly Model (fem). Researchers from the Network are also using the fem to quantify the value of current and future intergenerational support and resource-exchange for Americans aged sixty-½ve and older. They are simulating the effects of changes in pub lic assistance (via Social Security and Med icare) on these exchanges of money and time across familial generations. Look ing forward, the Network researchers' work will deepen our understanding of fu ture intergenerational exchange and support by anticipating future changes to the family.
Part of the challenge of building the Future Americans Model is taking into account the ways in which new family patterns will emerge for each age stratum in the next twenty years. But predicting fam - ily forms is fraught with challenges. For this reason, the Network has given a grant to a second team of researchers (headed by Chris Sepaki and including Andrew Cherlin, Emily Agee, and Douglas Wolfe) to build a framework for exploring how family forms may evolve over the decades. Such changes may also vary over socioeconomic strata (as well as family forms), affecting the potential flow of family assistance in the near future. The team will begin with different assumptions and an alternate approach to that of the fam team, using current information about the type and pace of changes in marriage, cohabitation, and fertility within and outside of wedlock. Both teams are exchanging information so that they can determine whether and how different assumptions about family change and the growth of inequality may affect public and private demands for health care and economic support. In the next year, they plan to publish the results from these simulations. This information will, in turn, give the ½rst team (which is modeling future patterns of costs and care for the elderly) a more speci½c and nuanced understanding of how demands on midlife parents and their children may overlap with the needs of the baby-boom generation as they age and require greater assistance from their families.
A third project, supported jointly by the Network and the Pew Foundation, involves data collection on a largely unexplored issue: how families in societies with more advanced population aging-such as Germany and Italy-are managing to deal with the simultaneous demands of caring for their children and their elderly parents. The emphasis is on measuring unmet or partially met needs of individuals in the family unit. As we discussed earlier, we an ticipate that, in an aging society, midlife parents in particular will face demands for assistance that are beyond their capacity to meet them. How do parents respond? Do they call on additional relatives such as grandchildren or siblings to help out? Do they look to public services? Or does the demand simply go unmet? The Network will compare the patterns in these already "older" societies with the circum stances of midlife parents in the United States.
To supplement this survey, researchers supported by the Network will be conducting in-depth interviews of family mem bers in a three-generation qualitative study carried out by human development researcher Karen Fingerman and her colleagues. 23 The aim of this research is to examine in depth how exchanges of support are initiated and responded to in daily life when the oldest generation be gins to need more assistance. In research on intergenerational exchange, very little attention has been paid to the needs families are unable to meet and what might remedy this shortfall. This qualitative re search may help us understand how and when gaps occur between the needs of the elderly and the supply of assistance.
This essay has sketched a picture of a demographic future that may pose considerable challenges for family systems in Western nations that during the twentieth century worked to strike a balance between public and private support. That balance is likely to change, and the economic and health costs of supporting the elderly generation while investing in younger generations will become formidable over the next thirty years. We have observed that this task is like ly to become more complex with the aging of the baby-boom cohort, changes in family systems, and the growing strati½cation of social classes and ethnic groups.
Despite this essay's overarching focus on the problems, there are some silver linings to the current demographic situation. The relative paucity of children (G3s) compared to the elderly (G1s) could mean that although seniors will be less ½nancially well-off on average, there will be a larger cohort of them to provide assistance to their children and grandchildren. The ratio of seniors to grandchildren is likely to soar in the next ½fteen to twenty years, suggesting the possibility of a greater flow of parent and grandparent assistance before the older generation requires assistance, by which point grandchildren may have become a more potent source of assistance to the elderly. In fact, we know very little about how flows of assistance to the young are reciprocated over longer stretches of time.
We do not dismiss the possibility that signi½cant social, economic, and demographic changes could alter the rather bleak scenario of declining support for the elder ly that we have projected. Nonetheless, the American public, unlike its European counterparts, appears to be relatively unaware of the looming problems facing it as the baby-boom cohort reaches an ad vanced age. 24 The pressures on an already overburdened and rapidly changing family system suggest that we could begin to see a diminution (if not a full reversal) of the downward flows of assistance from elderly parents and relatives to younger generations. Were this to happen, it could restrict social mobility and become an added source of inequality in the United States, which is already among the most so cioeconomically unequal of all econom ically developed nations. 
